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ABSTRACT
Artificial intelligence (AI) has widespread societal implications, yet social scientists are only be-
ginning to study public attitudes toward the technology. Existing studies find that the public’s trust
in institutions can play a major role in shaping the regulation of emerging technologies. Using a
large-scale survey (N=2000), we examined Americans’ perceptions of 13 AI governance challenges
as well as their trust in governmental, corporate, and multistakeholder institutions to responsibly
develop and manage AI. While Americans perceive all of the AI governance issues to be important for
tech companies and governments to manage, they have only low to moderate trust in these institutions
to manage AI applications.
1 Introduction
Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) could impact nearly all aspects of society, including the labor market, trans-
portation, healthcare, education, and national security (OECD, 2019). AI’s effects may be profoundly positive, but the
technology entails risks and disruptions that warrant attention. While technologists and policymakers have begun to dis-
cuss the societal implications of machine learning and AI more frequently, public opinion has not shaped much of these
conversations. Given AI’s broad impact, civil society groups argue that the public, particularly those underrepresented
in the tech industry, should have a role in shaping the technology (West et al., 2019).
In the U.S., public opinion has shaped policy outcomes (Caughey and Warshaw, 2018), including those concerning
immigration, free trade, international conflicts, and climate change mitigation. As in these other policy domains,
we expect the public to become more influential over time in impacting AI policy. It is thus vital to have a better
understanding of how the public thinks about AI and the governance of AI. Such understanding is essential to crafting
informed policy and identifying opportunities to educate the public about AI’s character, benefits, and risks.
Using an original, large-scale survey (N=2000), we studied how the American public perceives AI governance. The
overwhelming majority of Americans (82%) believe that AI and/or robots should be carefully managed. This statistic is
comparable to survey results from respondents residing in European Union countries, as seen in Figure 1. Furthermore,
Americans consider all of the 13 AI governance challenges presented in the survey to be important for tech companies
and governments to manage carefully.
∗The research was funded by the Ethics and Governance of Artificial Intelligence Fund and Good Ventures. For useful feedback
we would like to thank: Miles Brundage, Jack Clark, Kanta Dihal, Jeffrey Ding, Carrick Flynn, Ben Garfinkel, Rose Hadshar, Tim
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Remco Zwetsloot, and the YouGov Team (Marissa Shih and Sam Luks). In particular, we are grateful for Markus Anderljung’s
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Figure 1: Agreement with statement that robots and AI require careful management (EU data from 2017 Special
Eurobarometer #460)
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At the same time, Americans have only low to moderate levels of trust in governmental, corporate, and multistakeholder
institutions to develop and manage AI in the public’s interest. Public trust varies greatly between organizations. Broadly,
the public puts the most trust in university researchers (50% reporting “a fair amount of confidence” or “a great deal of
confidence”) and the U.S. military (49%); followed by scientific organizations, the Partnership on AI, tech companies
(excluding Facebook), and intelligence organizations; followed by U.S. federal or state governments, and the UN;
followed by Facebook. Contrary to existing research on attitudes toward other emerging technologies, our study finds
that individual-level trust in various actors to responsibly develop and manage AI does not predict one’s general support
for developing AI.
2 Background
2.1 Public Opinion and AI Governance
Studying public opinion allows us to anticipate how electoral politics could shape AI governance as policymakers seek
to regulate applications of the technology. Over the past two years, corporations, governments, civil society groups,
and multistakeholder organizations have published dozens of high-level AI ethics principles. These documents borrow
heavily from core principles in bioethics or medical ethics (Floridi and Cowls, 2019). But unlike medical ethics, which
is guided by the common aim of promoting the health of the patient, AI development does not share one common goal
but many goals (Mittelstadt, 2019). Furthermore, many of these AI ethics principles are at tension with each other
(Whittlestone et al., 2019). For instance, how does one improve the accuracy of algorithmic predictions while ensuring
fair and equal treatment of those impacted by the algorithm? As corporations and governments attempt to translate
these principles into practice, tensions between principles could lead to political contestation.
In the U.S., voters are divided on how to regulate facial recognition technology and algorithms used to display social
media content, with some of these divisions reflecting existing disagreements between partisans (Zhang, 2019). For
instance, Democrats, compared with Republicans, are much more opposed to law enforcement using facial recognition
technology (Smith, 2019). While several states and cities that are heavily Democrat have adopted or proposed
moratoriums on law enforcement using facial recognition technology, progress to enact federal regulation has been
slow. Industry self-regulation is not immune to partisan politics. For example, Google’s AI ethics board dissolved after
the company’s employees and external civil society groups protested the inclusion of Heritage Foundation president
Kay Coles James and drone company CEO Dyan Gibbens on the board. Recognizing the public’s divergent policy
preferences on AI governance issues is necessary to have a productive public policy deliberation.
2.2 How Trust in Institutions Affects Regulation of Emerging Technology
The public’s trust in various institutions to develop and manage AI could affect the regulation of the technology.
General social trust is negatively correlated with perceived risk from technological hazards (Siegrist et al., 2005). One
observational study finds that that general social distrust is positively correlated with support for government regulation,
even when the public perceives the government to be corrupt (Aghion et al., 2010). A follow-up study using more
extensive survey data suggests that the public prefers governmental regulation if they trust the government more than
they do major companies (Pitlik and Kouba, 2015). This latter finding is supported by how the public has reacted to
genetically modified (GM) foods and nanotechnology. These two emerging technologies are similar to AI in that the
public has to rely on those with scientific expertise when evaluating potential risks.
Distrust in institutions producing and regulating GM foods is a compelling explanation for the widespread opposition to
GM foods in developed countries. Those with a high-level trust of scientists and regulators are more accepting of GM
foods; in contrast, distrust of the agricultural/food industry, contrasted with trust in environmental watchdogs, predicts
opposition to GM foods (Siegrist, 1999, 2000; Lang and Hallman, 2005; Marques et al., 2015; Olofsson et al., 2006).
Although scientists are among the most trusted group in the U.S., Americans have cynical views toward scientists when
considering GM foods. Only 19% thinks that scientists understand the health consequences of GM foods very well, even
though scientists have formed a consensus that GM foods are safe to eat. Furthermore, the American public believes
that scientists are more motivated by concerns for their industry than concerns for the public (Funk and Kennedy, 2016).
Nanotechnology, though less salient than GM foods in the media, is the subject of extensive public opinion research.
A meta-analysis of 11 surveys conducted in developed countries finds that the public perceives that the use of
nanotechnology has greater benefits than risks; nevertheless, a large subset of the public is uncertain of the consequences
of nanotechnology (Satterfield et al., 2009). As in perceptions of GM foods, trust in institutions seems to play a
significant role in shaping attitudes toward nanotechnology. Americans who have lower confidence in business leaders
within the nanotechnology industry also perceive the technology to be riskier (Cobb and Macoubrie, 2004). A higher
level of distrust in government agencies to protect the public from nanotechnology hazards is associated with a higher
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perceived risk of the technology (Macoubrie, 2006; Siegrist et al., 2007b). Consumers who are less trustful of the food
industry indicate they are more reluctant to buy foods produced or packaged using nanotechnology (Siegrist et al.,
2007a).
2.3 Existing Survey Research on AI Governance and Trust in Tech Companies
Our survey builds on existing public opinion research on attitudes toward AI and trust in tech companies. Past survey
research related to AI tends to focus on specific governance challenges, such as lethal autonomous weapons (Horowitz,
2016), algorithmic fairness (Saxena et al., 2019), or facial recognition technology (Smith, 2019; Ada Lovelace Institute,
2019). A few large-scale surveys have taken a more comprehensive approach by asking about a range of AI governance
challenges (Eurobarometer, 2017; Smith and Anderson, 2016; Cave et al., 2019). We improved upon these surveys
by asking respondents to consider a variety of AI governance challenges using the same question-wording. This
consistency in question-wording allowed us to compare respondents’ perceptions toward major issues in AI governance.
Another innovation of our research project is that we connect AI governance with trust in tech companies. Trust in
tech companies has become a growing topic in survey research. While Americans perceive tech companies to have a
more positive impact on society than other institutions, including the news media and the government, their feelings
toward tech companies have declined dramatically since 2015 (Doherty and Kiley, 2019). Nevertheless, there exists
heterogeneity in how the public views individual tech companies; one consistent finding in non-academic surveys is that
the public strongly distrusts Facebook, particularly in its handling of personal data (Casey Newton and Zelenko, 2017;
Molla, 2018; Kahn and Ingram, 2018). In our survey, we examined whether this general distrust of tech companies
extend to their management of AI development and applications.
3 Survey Data and Analysis
We conducted an original online survey (N=2000) through YouGov between June 6 and 14, 2018. YouGov drew
a random sample from the U.S. adult population (i.e., the target sample) and selected respondents from its online
respondent panel that matched the target sample on key demographic variables. The details of YouGov’s sample
matching methodology can be found in the Appendix.
We pre-registered nearly all of the analysis on Open Science Framework (pre-analysis plan URL: https://osf.io/
7gqvm/). Pre-registration increases research transparency by requiring researchers to specify their analysis before
analyzing the data (Nosek et al., 2018). Doing so prevents researchers from misusing data analysis to come up with
statistically significant results when they do not exist, otherwise known as p-hacking. Survey weights provided by
YouGov were used in our primary analysis. We followed the Standard Operating Procedures for Don Green’s Lab at
Columbia University when handling missing data or “don’t know” responses (Lin and Green, 2016). Heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors were used to generate the margins of error at the 95% confidence level. We report cluster-robust
standard errors whenever there is clustering by respondent. In figures, each error bar shows the 95% confidence intervals.
4 Perceptions of AI Governance Challenges
4.1 Methodology
We sought to understand how Americans prioritize policy issues associated with AI. Respondents were asked to consider
five AI governance challenges, randomly selected from a set of 13 (see the Appendix for the full text); the order these
five were given to each respondent was also randomized. After considering each governance challenge, respondents
were asked how likely they think the challenge will affect large numbers of people both 1) in the U.S. and 2) around the
world within 10 years using a seven-point scale that displayed both numerical likelihoods and qualitative descriptions
(e.g., “Very unlikely: less than 5% chance (2.5%)”). Respondents were also asked to evaluate how important it is for
tech companies and governments to carefully manage each challenge presented to them using a four-point scale.
4.2 General Results
We use scatterplots to visualize our survey results. In the top graph in Figure 2, the x-axis is the perceived likelihood of
the problem happening to large numbers of people in the U.S. In the bottom graph, the x-axis is the perceived likelihood
of the problem happening to large numbers of people around the world. The y-axes on both graphs in Figure 2 represent
respondents’ perceived issue importance, from 0 (not at all important) to 3 (very important). Each dot represents the
mean perceived likelihood and issue importance. The correspondent ellipse represents the 95% confidence region of the
bivariate means assuming the two variables are distributed multivariate normal.
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Figure 2: Perceptions of AI governance challenges in the U.S. and around the world
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Americans consider all the AI governance challenges we present to be important: the mean perceived issues importance
of each governance challenge is between “somewhat important” (2) and “very important” (3), though there is meaningful
and discernible variation across items.
The AI governance challenges Americans think are most likely to impact large numbers of people, and are important
for tech companies and governments to tackle, are found in the upper-right quadrant of the two plots. These issues
include data privacy as well as AI-enhanced cyber attacks, surveillance, and digital manipulation. We note that the
media have widely covered these issues during the time of the survey.
There are a second set of governance challenges that are perceived on average, as about 7% less likely, and marginally
less important. These include autonomous vehicles, value alignment, bias in using AI for hiring, the U.S.-China arms
race, disease diagnosis, and technological unemployment. Finally, the third set of challenges are perceived on average
another 5% less likely, and about equally important, including criminal justice bias and critical AI systems failures.
We also note that Americans predict that all of the governance challenges mentioned in the survey, besides protecting
data privacy and ensuring the safety of autonomous vehicles, are more likely to impact people around the world than to
affect people in the U.S. While most of these statistically significant differences are substantively small, one difference
stands out: Americans think that autonomous weapons are 7.6 percentage points more likely to impact people around
the world than Americans (two-sided p-value < 0.001).
We want to reflect on one result. “Value alignment” consists of an abstract description of the alignment problem and a
reference to what sounds like individual level harms: “while performing jobs they could unintentionally make decisions
that go against the values of its human users, such as physically harming people.” “Critical AI systems failures,” by
contrast, references military or critical infrastructure uses, and unintentional accidents leading to “10 percent or more of
all humans to die.” The latter was weighted as less important than the former: we interpret this as a probability-weighted
assessment of importance, since presumably the latter, were it to happen, is much more important. We thus think the
issue importance question should be interpreted in a way that down-weights low probability risks.
4.3 Subgroup Analysis
We performed further analysis by calculating the percentage of respondents in each subgroup who consider each
governance challenge to be “very important” for governments and tech companies to manage. In general, differences
in responses are more salient across demographic subgroups than across governance challenges. In a linear multiple
regression predicting perceived issue importance using demographic subgroups, governance challenges, and the
interaction between the two, we find that the stronger predictors are demographic subgroup variables, including age
group and having CS or programming experience.
Two highly visible patterns emerge from our data visualization. First, a higher percentage of older respondents,
compared with younger respondents, consider nearly all AI governance challenges to be “very important.” In another
part of the survey (see Figure 7 in the Appendix), we find that older Americans, compared with younger Americans, are
less supportive of developing AI. Our results here might explain this age gap: older Americans see each AI governance
challenge as substantially more important than do younger Americans. Whereas 85% of Americans older than 73
consider each of these issues to be very important, only 40% of Americans younger than 38 do.
Second, those with CS or engineering degrees, compared with those who do not, rate all AI governance challenges as
less important. This result could explain another finding in our survey that shows those with CS or engineering degrees
tend to express greater support for developing AI. In Table 4 in the Appendix, we report the results of a saturated linear
model using demographic variables, governance challenges, and the interaction between these two types of variables to
predict perceived issue importance. We find that those who are 54-72 or 73 and older, relative to those who are below
38, view the governance challenges as more important (two-sided p-value < 0.001 for both comparisons). Furthermore,
we find that those who have CS or engineering degrees, relative to those who do not, view the governance challenges as
less important (two-sided p-value < 0.001).
5 Trust in Actors to Develop and Manage AI
5.1 Methodology
Respondents were asked how much confidence they have in various actors to develop AI. They were randomly assigned
five actors out of 15 to evaluate. We provided a short description of actors that are not well-known to the public (e.g.,
NATO, CERN, and OpenAI). Also, respondents were asked how much confidence, if any, they have in various actors to
manage the development and use of AI in the best interests of the public. They were randomly assigned five out of 15
actors to evaluate. Again, we provided a short description of actors that are not well-known to the public (e.g., AAAI
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and Partnership on AI). Confidence was measured using the same four-point scale described above. The two sets of
15 actors differed slightly because, for some actors, it seemed inappropriate to ask one or the other question. See the
Appendix for the exact wording of the questions and descriptions of the actors.
5.2 Results
Americans do not express great confidence in most actors to develop or to manage AI, as seen in Figures 5 and 6
in the Appendix. A majority of Americans do not have a “great deal” or even a “fair amount” of confidence in any
institution, except university researchers, to develop AI. Furthermore, Americans place greater trust in tech companies
and non-governmental organizations (e.g., OpenAI) than in governments to manage the development and use of the
technology.
University researchers and the U.S. military are the most trusted groups to develop AI: about half of Americans express
a “great deal” or even a “fair amount” of confidence in them. Americans express slightly less confidence in tech
companies, non-profit organizations (e.g., OpenAI)2, and American intelligence organizations. Nevertheless, opinions
toward individual actors within each of these groups vary. For example, while 44% of Americans indicated they feel a
“great deal” or even a “fair amount” of confidence in tech companies, they rate Facebook as the least trustworthy of all
the actors. More than four in 10 indicate that they have no confidence in the company.
Our survey was conducted between June 6 and 14, 2018, shortly after the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal
became highly salient in the media. On April 10-11, 2018, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg testified before the U.S.
Congress regarding the Cambridge Analytica data leak. On May 2, 2018, Cambridge Analytica announced its shutdown.
Nevertheless, Americans’ distrust of the company existed before the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal. In a pilot
survey that we conducted on Mechanical Turk during July 13–14, 2017, respondents indicated a substantially lower
level of confidence in Facebook, compared with other actors, to develop and regulate AI.
The results on the public’s trust of various actors to manage the develop and use of AI provided are similar to the results
discussed above. Again, a majority of Americans do not have a “great deal” or even a “fair amount” of confidence in
any institution to manage AI. In general, the public expresses greater confidence in non-governmental organizations
than in governmental ones. Indeed, 41% of Americans express a “great deal” or even a “fair amount” of confidence in
“tech companies,” compared with 26% who feel that way about the U.S. federal government. But when presented with
individual big tech companies, Americans indicate less trust in each than in the broader category of “tech companies.”
Once again, Facebook stands out as an outlier: respondents give it a much lower rating than any other actor. Besides
“tech companies,” the public places relatively high trust in intergovernmental research organizations (e.g., CERN)3, the
Partnership on AI, and non-governmental scientific organizations (e.g., AAAI). Nevertheless, because the public is less
familiar with these organizations, about one in five respondents give a “don’t know” response.
Similar to our findings, recent survey research suggests that while Americans feel that AI should be regulated, they are
unsure who the regulators should be. When asked who “should decide how AI systems are designed and deployed,”
half of Americans indicated they do not know or refused to answer (West, 2018). Our survey results also seem to
reflect Americans’ general attitudes toward public institutions. According to a 2016 Pew Research Center survey, an
overwhelming majority of Americans have “a great deal” or “a fair amount” of confidence in the U.S. military and
scientists to act in the best interest of the public. In contrast, public confidence in elected officials is much lower: 73%
indicated that they have “not too much confidence” or “no confidence” (Funk, 2017). Less than one-third of Americans
thought that tech companies do what’s right “most of the time” or “just about always”; moreover, more than half indicate
that tech companies have too much power and influence in the U.S. economy (Smith, 2018). Nevertheless, Americans’
attitudes toward tech companies are not monolithic but varies by company. For instance, our research findings reflect
the results from several non-academic surveys that find the public distrusts Facebooks significantly more than other
major tech companies (Casey Newton and Zelenko, 2017; Molla, 2018; Kahn and Ingram, 2018).
5.3 Predicting Support for Developing AI Using Institutional Trust
The American public’s support for developing AI is not predicted by their trust in various actors to develop and manage
AI. Our null results stand in contrast to studies of GM foods and nanotechnology, where trust in institutions that develop
and regulate the technology is associated with greater support for the technology.
2At the time the survey was conducted (June 2018), OpenAI was a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization. In March 2019, OpenAI
announced it is restructuring into “capped-profit” company to attract investments.
3We asked about trust in intergovernmental research organizations, such as CERN, because some policy researchers have proposed
creating a politically neutral AI development hub similar to CERN to avoid risks associated with competition in AI development
between rival states (Fischer and Wenger, 2019).
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Table 1: Regression results: predicting support for developing AI using respondents’ trust in different types of actors to
develop AI
Variable Coefficient (SE) p-value
Corporate actors -0.02 (0.03) 0.596
International actors -0.01 (0.03) 0.830
U.S. government actors -0.01 (0.03) 0.799
Intercept 0.26 (0.03) <0.001
N = 10000 observations from 2000 respondents (standard errors are clustered by respondent); F -statistic: 3.976 on 79
and 1999 DF, p-value: < 0.001. We controlled for the demographic variables found in Table 3.
Table 2: Regression result: predicting support for developing AI using respondents’ trust in different types of actors to
manage AI
Variable Coefficient (SE) p-value
Corporate actors -0.03 (0.02) 0.271
International actors 0.02 (0.03) 0.517
U.S. government actors 0.02 (0.03) 0.449
Intercept 0.26 (0.03) <0.001
N = 10000 observations from 2000 respondents (standard errors are clustered by respondent); F -statistic: 3.998 on 79
and 1999 DF, p-value: < 0.001. We controlled for the demographic variables found in Table 3.
For our analysis, we use multiple linear regression to whether individual-level trust in various types of institutions
can predict support for developing AI. Note that this analysis is not included in our pre-registration and is therefore
exploratory in nature. There are four categories of actors (the same ones shown in Figure 4): U.S. government,
international bodies, corporate, and others (e.g., universities and non-profits). In our regressions, the group “others” is
the reference group. Support for developing AI is measured using a five-point Likert scale, with -2 meaning “strongly
oppose” and 2 meaning “strongly support.” Our regressions controlled for all the demographic variables shown in Table
3 in the Appendix. Trust in none of the actor types predicts support for developing AI, as seen in Tables 1 and 2.
6 Conclusion
To understand what the American public thinks about the regulation of the technology, we conducted a large-scale
survey. The survey reveals that while Americans consider all AI governance challenges to have high issue importance,
they do not necessarily trust the actors who have the power to develop and manage the technology to act in the public’s
interest. Nevertheless, as our exploratory analysis from the previous section shows, institutional distrust does not
necessarily predict opposition to AI development.
One direction for future research is to examine other factors that shape the public’s preferences toward AI governance.
Technological knowledge, moral and psychological attributes, and perceptions of risks versus benefits are associated
with support for GM foods and nanotechnology (Scott et al., 2018; Satterfield et al., 2009). Another direction for
future research is to improve the measurement of institutional trust. Our existing survey questions focused on the
public interest component of trust; future studies could investigate other components of trust, such as competence,
transparency, and honesty (Lang and Hallman, 2005). Finally, we plan to investigate whether the public’s perceived
lack of political power makes them more distrustful of institutions to govern AI. In a recent survey of the British public,
a large majority felt that they were unable to influence AI development, and many felt tech companies and governments
have disproportionate influence (Cave et al., 2019). Research on public perceptions of AI is nascent but could have a
broad impact as AI governance moves from the realm of abstract principles into the world of mass politics.
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A YouGov Sampling and Weights
YouGov interviewed 2387 respondents who were then matched down to a sample of 2000 to produce the final dataset.
The respondents were matched to a sampling frame on gender, age, race, and education. The frame was constructed by
stratified sampling from the full 2016 American Community Survey (ACS) one-year sample with selection within strata
by weighted sampling with replacements (using the person weights on the public use file).
The matched cases were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The matched cases and the frame were
combined and a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in the frame. The propensity score function included
age, gender, race/ethnicity, years of education, and geographic region. The propensity scores were grouped into deciles
of the estimated propensity score in the frame and post-stratified according to these deciles.
The weights were then post-stratified on 2016 U.S. presidential vote choice, and a four-way stratification of gender, age
(four-categories), race (four-categories), and education (four-categories), to produce the final weight.
B Text of the Questions
Below, we present the survey text as shown to respondents. The numerical codings are shown in parentheses following
each answer choice.
B.1 Should AI and/or robots should be carefully managed
Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement.
[Respondents were presented with one statement randomly selected from the list below.]
• AI and robots are technologies that require careful management.
• AI is a technology that requires careful management.
• Robots are technologies that require careful management.
ANSWER CHOICES:
• Totally agree (2)
• Tend to agree (1)
• Tend to disagree (-1)
• Totally disagree (-2)
• I don’t know
B.2 Support for developing AI
[All respondents were presented with the following prompt.]
Next, we would like to ask you questions about your attitudes toward artificial intelligence.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) refers to computer systems that perform tasks or make decisions that usually require human
intelligence. AI can perform these tasks or make these decisions without explicit human instructions. Today, AI has
been used in the following applications:
[Respondents were shown five items randomly selected from the list below.]
• Translate over 100 different languages
• Predict one’s Google searches
• Identify people from their photos
• Diagnose diseases like skin cancer and common illnesses
• Predict who are at risk of various diseases
• Help run factories and warehouses
• Block spam email
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• Play computer games
• Help conduct legal case research
• Categorize photos and videos
• Detect plagiarism in essays
• Spot abusive messages on social media
• Predict what one is likely to buy online
• Predict what movies or TV shows one is likely to watch online
QUESTION: How much do you support or oppose the development of AI?
ANSWER CHOICES:
• Strongly support (2)
• Somewhat support (1)
• Neither support nor oppose (0)
• Somewhat oppose (-1)
• Strongly oppose (-2)
• I don’t know
B.3 AI governance challenges
We would like you to consider some potential policy issues related to AI. Please consider the following:
[Respondents were shown five randomly-selected items from the list below, one item at a time. For ease of comprehen-
sion, we include the shorten labels used in the figures in bold.]
• Hiring bias: Fairness and transparency in AI used in hiring: Increasingly, employers are using AI to make
hiring decisions. AI has the potential to make less biased hiring decisions than humans. But algorithms trained
on biased data can lead to lead to hiring practices that discriminate against certain groups. Also, AI used in
this application may lack transparency, such that human users do not understand what the algorithm is doing,
or why it reaches certain decisions in specific cases.
• Criminal justice bias: Fairness and transparency in AI used in criminal justice: Increasingly, the criminal
justice system is using AI to make sentencing and parole decisions. AI has the potential to make less biased
hiring decisions than humans. But algorithms trained on biased data could lead to discrimination against certain
groups. Also, AI used in this application may lack transparency such that human users do not understand what
the algorithm is doing, or why it reaches certain decisions in specific cases.
• Disease diagnosis: Accuracy and transparency in AI used for disease diagnosis: Increasingly, AI software
has been used to diagnose diseases, such as heart disease and cancer. One challenge is to make sure the AI
can correctly diagnose those who have the disease and not mistakenly diagnose those who do not have the
disease. Another challenge is that AI used in this application may lack transparency such that human users do
not understand what the algorithm is doing, or why it reaches certain decisions in specific cases.
• Data privacy: Protect data privacy: Algorithms used in AI applications are often trained on vast amounts of
personal data, including medical records, social media content, and financial transactions. Some worry that
data used to train algorithms are not collected, used, and stored in ways that protect personal privacy.
• Autonomous vehicles: Make sure autonomous vehicles are safe: Companies are developing self-driving cars
and trucks that require little or no input from humans. Some worry about the safety of autonomous vehicles
for those riding in them as well as for other vehicles, cyclists, and pedestrians.
• Ditigal manipulation: Prevent AI from being used to spread fake and harmful content online: AI has been
used by governments, private groups, and individuals to harm or manipulate internet users. For instance,
automated bots have been used to generate and spread false and/or harmful news stories, audios, and videos.
• Cyber attacks: Prevent AI cyber attacks against governments, companies, organizations, and individuals:
Computer scientists have shown that AI can be used to launch effective cyber attacks. AI could be used to
hack into servers to steal sensitive information, shut down critical infrastructures like power grids or hospital
networks, or scale up targeted phishing attacks.
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• Surveillance: Prevent AI-assisted surveillance from violating privacy and civil liberties: AI can be used
to process and analyze large amounts of text, photo, audio, and video data from social media, mobile
communications, and CCTV cameras. Some worry that governments, companies, and employers could use AI
to increase their surveillance capabilities.
• U.S.-China arms race: Prevent escalation of a U.S.-China AI arms race: Leading analysts believe that an
AI arms race is beginning, in which the U.S. and China are investing billions of dollars to develop powerful
AI systems for surveillance, autonomous weapons, cyber operations, propaganda, and command and control
systems. Some worry that a U.S.-China arms race could lead to extreme dangers. To stay ahead, the U.S. and
China may race to deploy advanced military AI systems that they do not fully understand or can control. We
could see catastrophic accidents, such as a rapid, automated escalation involving cyber and nuclear weapons.
• Value alignment: Make sure AI systems are safe, trustworthy, and aligned with human values: As AI systems
become more advanced, they will increasingly make decisions without human input. One potential fear is that
AI systems, while performing jobs they are programmed to do, could unintentionally make decisions that go
against the values of its human users, such as physically harming people.
• Autonomous weapons: Ban the use of lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs): Lethal autonomous weapons
(LAWs) are military robots that can attack targets without control by humans. LAWs could reduce the use of
human combatants on the battlefield. But some worry that the adoption of LAWs could lead to mass violence.
Because they are cheap and easy to produce in bulk, national militaries, terrorists, and other groups could
readily deploy LAWs.
• Technological unemployment: Guarantee a good standard of living for those who lose their jobs to automa-
tion: Some forecast that AI will increasingly be able to do jobs done by humans today. AI could potentially do
the jobs of blue-collar workers, like truckers and factory workers, as well as the jobs of white-collar workers,
like financial analysts or lawyers. Some worry that in the future, robots and computers can do most of the jobs
that are done by humans today.
• Critical AI systems failure: Prevent critical AI systems failures: As AI systems become more advanced, they
could be used by the military or in critical infrastructure, like power grids, highways, or hospital networks.
Some worry that the failure of AI systems or unintentional accidents in these applications could cause 10
percent or more of all humans to die.
QUESTION: In the next 10 years, how likely do you think it is that this AI governance challenge will impact large
numbers of people in the U.S.?
ANSWER CHOICES:
• Very unlikely: less than 5% chance (2.5%)
• Unlikely: 5-20% chance (12.5%)
• Somewhat unlikely: 20-40% chance (30%)
• Equally likely as unlikely: 40-60% chance (50%)
• Somewhat likely: 60-80% chance (70%)
• Likely: 80-95% chance (87.5%)
• Very likely: more than 95% chance (97.5%)
• I don’t know
QUESTION: In the next 10 years, how likely do you think it is that this AI governance challenge will impact large
numbers of people around the world?
ANSWER CHOICES:
• Very unlikely: less than 5% chance (2.5%)
• Unlikely: 5-20% chance (12.5%)
• Somewhat unlikely: 20-40% chance (30%)
• Equally likely as unlikely: 40-60% chance (50%)
• Somewhat likely: 60-80% chance (70%)
• Likely: 80-95% chance (87.5%)
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• Very likely: more than 95% chance (97.5%)
• I don’t know
QUESTION: In the next 10 years, how important is it for tech companies and governments to carefully manage the
following challenge?
ANSWER CHOICES:
• Very important (3)
• Somewhat important (2)
• Not too important (1)
• Not at all important (0)
• I don’t know
B.4 Trust of actors to develop AI
QUESTION: How much confidence, if any, do you have in each of the following to develop AI in the best interests of
the public?
[Respondents were shown five items randomly selected from the list below. We included explainer text for actors not
well known to the public; respondents could view the explainer text by hovering their mouse over the actor’s name. The
items and the answer choices were shown in a matrix format.]
• The U.S. military
• The U.S. civilian government
• National Security Agency (NSA)
• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
• Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
• North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); explainer text for NATO: NATO is a military alliance that includes
28 countries including most of Europe, as well as the U.S. and Canada.
• An international research organization (e.g., CERN); explainer text for CERN: The European Organization
for Nuclear Research, known as CERN, is a European research organization that operates the largest particle
physics laboratory in the world.
• Tech companies
• Google
• Facebook
• Apple
• Microsoft
• Amazon
• A non-profit AI research organization (e.g., OpenAI); explainer text for OpenAI: Open AI is an AI non-profit
organization with backing from tech investors that seeks to develop safe AI. University researchers
ANSWER CHOICES:
• A great deal of confidence (3)
• A fair amount of confidence (2)
• Not too much confidence (1)
• No confidence (0)
• I don’t know
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B.5 Trust of actors to manage AI
QUESTION: How much confidence, if any, do you have in each of the following to manage the development and use of
AI in the best interests of the public?
[Respondents were shown five items randomly selected from the list below. We included explainer text for actors not
well known to the public; respondents could view the explainer text by hovering their mouse over the actor’s name. The
items and the answer choices were shown in a matrix format.]
• U.S. federal government
• U.S. state governments
• International organizations (e.g., United Nations, European Union)
• The United Nations (UN)
• An intergovernmental research organization (e.g., CERN); explainer text for CERN: The European Organi-
zation for Nuclear Research, known as CERN, is a European research organization that operates the largest
particle physics laboratory in the world.
• Tech companies
• Google
• Facebook
• Apple
• Microsoft
• Amazon
• Non-government scientific organizations (e.g., AAAI); explainer text for AAAI: Association for the Advance-
ment of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) is a non-government scientific organization that promotes research in,
and responsible use of AI. Partnership on AI, an association of tech companies, academics, and civil society
groups
ANSWER CHOICES:
• A great deal of confidence (3)
• A fair amount of confidence (2)
• Not too much confidence (1)
• No confidence (0)
• I don’t know
C Additional Tables and Figures
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Demographic subgroup Unweighted sam-
ple size
Age 18-37 702
Age 38-53 506
Age 54-72 616
Age 73 and older 176
Female 1048
Male 952
White 1289
Non-white 711
HS or less 742
Some college 645
College+ 613
Not employed 1036
Employed (full- or part-time) 964
Income less than $30K 531
Income $30-70K 626
Income $70-100K 240
Income more than $100K 300
Prefer not to say income 303
Republican 470
Democrat 699
Independent/Other 831
Christian 1061
No religious affiliation 718
Other religion 221
Not born-again Christian 1443
Born-again Christian 557
No CS or engineering degree 1805
CS or engineering degree 195
No CS or programming experience 1265
CS or programming experience 735
Table 3: Size of demographic subgroups
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Variable Coefficient (SE)
Age 38-53 0.11 (0.07)
Age 54-72 0.35 (0.06)***
Age 73 and older 0.44 (0.07)***
Male 0.02 (0.05)
Non-white -0.01 (0.05)
Some college 0.03 (0.07)
College+ 0.15 (0.07)*
Employed (full- or part-time) -0.09 (0.06)
Income $30-70K 0.09 (0.08)
Income $70-100K 0.13 (0.10)
Income more than $100K -0.01 (0.10)
Prefer not to say income 0.04 (0.08)
Democrat 0.13 (0.07)
Independent/Other 0.14 (0.07)
No religious affiliation -0.04 (0.06)
Other religion -0.05 (0.08)
Born-again Christian 0.07 (0.07)
CS or engineering degree -0.35 (0.10)***
CS or programming experience -0.01 (0.07)
Criminal justice bias 0.05 (0.13)
Disease diagnosis -0.06 (0.14)
Data privacy 0.16 (0.13)
Autonomous vehicles -0.07 (0.14)
Digital manipulation -0.14 (0.15)
Cyber attacks 0.05 (0.14)
Surveillance <0.01 (0.15)
U.S.-China arms race 0.04 (0.13)
Value alignment -0.06 (0.13)
Autonomous weapons 0.06 (0.14)
Technological unemployment -0.12 (0.14)
Critical AI systems failure -0.27 (0.15)
Intercept 2.25 (0.11)***
N = 10000 observations, 2000
respondents
F (259,1999) = 3.36;
p-value: <0.001
Table 4: Results from a saturated regression predicting perceived issue importance using demographic variables, AI
governance challenge, and interactions between the two types of variables; the coefficients for the interactions variables
are not shown due to space constraints
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Figure 5: Trust in various actors to develop AI: distribution of responses
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